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EDITORIAL
THE ARCTIC IS STREWN with the names of Europeans 
drawn by the lure of trade and riches -- Dutch explorer 
Willem Barentsz, Dane Vitus Bering, Britain’s William 
Baffin, for example and there are hundreds more. Close 
behind them came fur traders, whalers, gold-seekers and 
others who left a legacy of Indigenous oppression and 
devastating ecological impacts. 
After a couple of centuries of relative neglect, the Arctic 
is once again drawing Europeans and for many of the 
same reasons. At the same time, the region is at the very 
centre of debates on climate change as it warms twice as 
fast as the global average and drives global impacts such 
as rising sea levels and melting sea ice which is opening 
up the Arctic Ocean and spurring 
renewed interest in Arctic resources 
and trade routes. 
This time, however, the rule of 
international law is more entrenched 
in the Arctic, and the people of the 
Arctic are better prepared to defend 
their rights and interests. 
As I write this, the European Com-
mission is preparing to release a 
“communication” that is expected to officially set out 
the EU’s interests in the Arctic in the coming years. 
WWF provided input to this process that we hope will be 
reflected in this upcoming policy paper. 
For example, WWF has recommended more research 
to help understand and predict Arctic change, particu-
larly regarding ecosystems, the sustainability of fisheries 
and the transition from fossil fuels (especially diesel) to 
renewables for energy production. This should go hand-
in-hand with support for investments in alternative socio-
economic models fostering economic diversification into 
sectors other than extractive industries.
The EU should also provide political support for nature 
conservation in the region, and for the creation and 
management of a pan-Arctic network of protected areas, 
including areas of particular ecological importance in 
terms of climate change resilience, communities and spe-
cies conservation. 
Wildlife products have long provided livelihoods for 
Arctic Indigenous peoples, and it is important to ensure 
that their use and trade is based on sustainable practices. 
The EU can do much to educate consumers on wildlife 
products, perhaps through certification schemes. 
The EU should also enforce compliance of European 
businesses operating in the Arctic with international, EU 
and national regulations, as well as with Arctic-specific 
standards and guidelines to address marine noise, oil 
spill prevention, pollution, carbon intensity, and fisheries.
As well, many internationally agreed goals such as 
limiting global temperature rise to well below 2C, halt-
ing global biodiversity loss by 2020, 
and establishing 
marine protected 
areas, will benefit 
the Arctic region, 
given its unique 
exposure to cli-
mate change and 
nature degrada-
tion.
In this issue, 
our contributors examine the renewed 
European interest in the Arctic through 
the prism of the European Union – the economic and 
political bloc that includes 28 European countries.
Alyson Bailes lists some common interests of the Arc-
tic and the EU, while Lord Robin Teverson argues that 
accepting the EU into its ranks would strengthen the 
Arctic Council. Diana Wallis reflects on past policies that 
haunt the EU’s place in the Arctic today. When asked how 
the EU can contribute, member of the Norwegian Sami 
Parliament Christina Henriksen put it succinctly: “Buy 
our products, respect our rights and ensure our future.”
This time around, the people of the EU can explore the 
Arctic’s potential more ethically and sustainably than 
they did centuries ago. Instead of leaving their names on 
the map, they can leave a legacy of support for the Arctic 
environment, and for Arctic peoples. l
GENEVIÈVE PONS is 
the Director of the 
European office of 
WWF.
Leaving a legacy
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THIS TIME THE PEO-
PLE OF THE ARCTIC ARE 
BETTER PREPARED TO 
DEFEND THEIR RIGHTS 
AND INTERESTS 
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Proposed Greenland mine lacks crisis plan: WWF
IN BRIEF
Nunavut sealing 
industry gets 
federal boost
THE GOVERNMENT of Canada 
has pledged $150,000 to pro-
mote Nunavut’s ailing sealing 
industry and take advantage 
of Nunavut’s exemption to 
the European Union’s ban on 
seal products.
The funding is the first 
installment from the 5-year, 
$5.7 million Certification and 
Market Access Program for 
Seals.
“I think it’s a big step 
between Canada and Nuna-
vut to be able to find differ-
ent ways for marketing our 
seal products,” Nunavut’s 
Member of Parliament and 
the Minister of Fisheries and 
Oceans, Hunter Tootoo told 
the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation.  “It’s all about 
opening new markets for our 
Indigenous seal products.”
The EU had imposed 
a ban on seal products in 
2009 causing international 
demand and prices for seal-
skin products to plummet. 
In 2015 the EU approved the 
Government of Nunavut’s 
application for an exemption 
to the ban under the Indig-
enous Communities Exemp-
tion of the EU Seal Regime. 
This means the Government 
of Nunavut will be able to 
certify that sealskins were 
harvested according to the 
rules of the exemption, there-
by allowing Nunavut hunters 
to sell their sealskin pelts and 
products in the European 
market again. 
Arctic Council 
support sought 
by environmental 
groups for heavy 
fuel oil ban 
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS 
want the eight circumpolar 
countries to take a stand on 
banning the use of heavy fuel 
oil, considered one of the 
greatest threats to the Arctic 
ecosystem.
“We believe that measures 
are desperately needed to 
reduce the environmental 
impacts from Arctic shipping, 
and that a logical place to 
focus attention is vessel fuel 
quality,” said a letter from 15 
international environmental 
groups to the Arctic Council.
Heavy fuel oil powers 
almost all the large cargo 
ships that ply Arctic waters. 
Unlike other fuels, it doesn’t 
evaporate but combines 
with seawater and expands 
in volume. It also sinks and 
sticks to anything it contacts, 
making cleanup impossible 
as seen during a recent spill 
in Russian waters that killed 
hundreds of seabirds.
“There’s just no way to 
respond to it,” said Kevin 
Harun of Pacific Environ-
ment, an environmental 
group that works with abo-
riginal communities to pro-
tect the Pacific Rim.
Burning heavy fuel oil 
also creates “black carbon,” 
fine soot that falls on snow 
and ice and hastens melting. 
Cleaning up black carbon has 
been identified as one of the 
DISASTER PREPAREDNESS 
plans are incomplete or 
missing for a zinc and 
lead mine proposed 
in the world’s largest 
national park, according 
to an analysis by WWF-
Denmark. The mine in 
Northeast Greenland 
National Park would 
require increased ship-
ping through an open-
water area important for 
narwhal, walrus, polar 
bears and bowheads. 
WWF is calling for a full 
contingency plan for ship-
ping before consultation 
on the mine proceeds. 
WWF found it “very 
troubling that the plans 
do not follow Råstofde-
partementets Guidelines 
on preparation of the 
assessment of the effects 
on the environment.” 
The guidelines stipulate 
that all studies conducted 
should be made pub-
lic. WWF found several 
reports were not included 
in the consultation docu-
ments, other key studies 
were apparently not car-
ried out and several stud-
ies were incomplete. 
Following WWF’s 
criticism, the Greenlandic 
Cabinet, in cooperation 
with the company, Iron-
bark Zinc Ltd., decided 
to publish several of the 
missing reports on Iron-
bark’s website.  The area 
in question, in the north-
east of Greenland, is an 
environmentally sensitive 
area which contains one 
of Greenland’s main open 
water areas, the North 
East Greenland polynya. 
Proposed zinc 
and lead mine
Northeast 
Greenland 
National Park
Washington Land
Citronen Fjord
Mestersvig
Ironbark Zinc Ltd projects
North East 
Greenland 
polynya
Arctic Circle
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easiest and quickest ways to 
slow the retreat of Arctic sea 
ice.
Reducing black carbon has 
been a top priority for the 
Arctic Council. However, the 
International Marine Organi-
zation which sets the rules 
for international shipping 
recently bowed to pressure 
from countries  –  such as 
Russia  – which have large 
merchant fleets that use 
the fuel. The IMO left the 
issue out of the Polar Code it 
adopted last year.
“It’s time for the Arctic 
Council to take the lead,” 
Harun said. “It would be a 
very strong message to IMO 
if the Arctic Council were to 
recommend a (heavy fuel oil) 
ban.”
WWF has been pressing 
council members and observ-
ers to include heavy fuel oils 
in an update to the polar 
code. The fuel is already 
banned in Antarctica and 
around the Norwegian Arctic 
Svalbard archipelago.
Last Ice Area and 
Pikialasorsuaq 
Commission
THE PIKIALASORSUAQ Com-
mission – set up by the 
Inuit Circumpolar Council to 
examine the future of an area 
of open water between Can-
ada and Greenland – held its 
first meeting in Iqaluit, Can-
ada, in January 2016. This 
area, also known as the north 
water polynya, remains open 
even in the middle of winter, 
providing a critical feeding 
area for animals, and food 
for Inuit from the region. The 
commissioners also attended 
a Last Ice Area workshop 
that brought together Inuit 
from Greenland and Canada 
to discuss management 
options for the ice around the 
polynya. This area is where 
summer sea ice is projected 
to last the longest, so while 
the polynya is important 
habitat in winter, the Last Ice 
Area will be important habi-
tat in the summer.
IN BRIEF
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Zhupanova hydropower plant delayed
RUSSIA’S Presidential Exec-
utive Office has postponed 
plans for construction of a 
hydropower plant on the 
Zhupanova River for ten 
years.
The Ministry of Natural 
Resources and “RusHy-
dro” – Russia’s key agent in 
implementing hydropower 
development projects – 
have agreed that the Zhu-
panova HPP construction 
can severely damage the 
unique nature of the Kam-
chatka peninsula, drasti-
cally change the river’s eco-
system and negatively affect 
the territory of Kronotsky 
reserve, a site included in 
the UNESCO World Herit-
age List.
“WWF is very critical of 
this project,” says Sergey 
Rafanov, head of Kamchat-
ka/Bering Sea ecoregional 
office. “We insisted that 
the project be reconsidered 
because there are other, 
much more sustainable 
alternatives. The Zhupano-
va HPP project – with the 
construction of three dams 
– would   annihilate the 
river’s recreational and fish-
ing potential and negatively 
affect all species inhabiting 
the river’s basin.”
 The Zhupanova River is 
a pristine salmon and trout 
river on the southeast Kam-
chatka peninsula that also 
boasts brown bears, eagles, 
and other birds and wildlife. 
There is a small commercial 
salmon harvesting opera-
tion at the mouth of the 
river as well as a fly fishing 
tourist lodge. One type of 
fish caught on the Zhupano-
va is a very large rainbow 
trout caught on a “fly” that 
resembles a mouse. The fish 
also eat voles. 
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What does the EU want,  
what can it offer?
One of the few things most people know about the European Union (EU) in the Arctic 
is that it has repeatedly been denied formal Observer status at the Arctic Council – the 
region’s dedicated organ for cooperation. That may give the impression that one of 
Europe’s strongest organizations is still knocking on the door of the Arctic from the out-
side. As ALYSON BAILES writes, that is not the case. 
THE EU IS ALREADY interlinked with the 
Arctic at many levels: membership, 
partnership, trade, rule-making, and 
practical cooperation. Whether this 
complex relationship is optimally man-
aged is a different question. Is the EU 
clear on what it wants from the Arctic 
process, and effective in pursuing it? Is 
it working as best it might for a peace-
ful, sustainable Arctic future? 
To start with 
the facts: three 
of the Arctic 
Council’s eight 
member states 
– Denmark, 
Finland and 
Sweden – are 
full EU mem-
bers. Two more, 
Iceland and 
Norway, as members of the European 
Economic Area, belong to the Single 
Market and the Schengen Convention – 
agreements that make them part of the 
EU’s single territory without internal 
borders or regulatory obstacles for the 
free movement of goods and services, 
and with a common visa policy. 
The remaining three, Canada, Rus-
sia and the US, are key partners of 
the EU in trade, investment and other 
policy areas. All EU rules and agree-
ments accepted by these countries apply 
equally to their northernmost terri-
torities and, indeed, to their Extended 
Economic Zones in the Arctic seas. This 
EU ‘regulatory footprint’ is particularly 
strong in the case of fisheries manage-
ment – on which Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands, while not included in 
Denmark’s EU membership, also have 
agreements with Brussels – and on cli-
mate change policy. 
Given the way ‘money talks’ how-
ever, European economic and financial 
involvement is at least equally impor-
tant. The EU is the leading foreign cus-
tomer for oil and gas already produced 
in the Arctic by Russia and Norway, and 
for Arctic catches of fish. It registers and 
insures a significant proportion of Arctic 
shipping and generates an increasing 
flow of tourism into the Arctic lands 
and seas. Brussels also supplies funds 
for cooperative projects from Russia 
to Greenland through its Northern 
Dimension regional programme and 
other cross-border frameworks in 
Northernmost Europe. It spends a large 
and growing amount on Arctic-related 
monitoring and research.
When the EU first began framing an 
Arctic policy in 2008-09, it made clear 
that its main interest lay in a peaceful 
Arctic future grounded in law-based 
cooperation. Conflict or even violent 
competition around the Pole would be 
bound to spill over southwards, bring-
ing strategic as well as economic risks. 
Accordingly, the EU supports the Arctic 
Council’s current policy of working as 
normally as possible with Russia on 
Arctic issues despite the Ukraine-related 
crisis. 
Brussels has consistently backed 
other goals of the Arctic Council such as 
environmental protection and sustain-
able economic development, shipping 
safety, scientific cooperation, and the 
rights of Indigenous peoples. It can 
use its powerful regulatory clout and 
financial incentives to promote these. 
On other issues, such as its anti-whaling 
CONFLICT OR EVEN 
VIOLENT COMPETI-
TION AROUND THE POLE 
WOULD BE BOUND TO 
SPILL OVER SOUTH-
WARDS, BRINGING 
STRATEGIC AS WELL 
AS ECONOMIC RISKS
ALYSON 
BAILES is an 
Adjunct Pro-
fessor at the 
University of 
Iceland specializing in 
Nordic & Arctic security 
issues
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Arctic Circle
Rome
Reykjavik
Copenhagen
Paris
Vienna
Amsterdam
France
Belgium
Slovakia
Russia
Slovenia
Lithuania
Member of the 
European Union (EU)
Arctic member of the EU
Arctic member of 
EU’s European Economic Area
Greenland is an Overseas 
Countries and Territories (OCT) of 
the EU because of its political 
union with Denmark. Greenland 
has some integration with the 
EU's internal market via associa-
tion agreements.Greenlandic 
citizens have EU citizenship.
Map: Ketill Berger, filmform.no • Source: Wikipedia, Natural Earth
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Dealing the seal
One issue continues to cloud the EU’s role in the Arctic. The 
sealskin trade issue has become emblematic of the Union’s 
failure to maintain the interests of Arctic peoples. Former 
Member of the European Parliament DIANA WALLIS reflects 
on the campaign that has haunted EU-Arctic relations.
AS I WRITE THIS, it is the day after Christ-
mas Day. In many rural communities 
in England this day is still marked by 
the so-called Boxing Day hunt, although 
the actual killing of a wild fox is now 
banned. I have often wondered whether, 
in 2008/2009 as the European Parlia-
ment’s rapportuer on the proposal for 
a Regulation on the Trade in Seal Prod-
ucts, what the feeling would have been if 
the EU and not our Westminster Parlia-
ment had sought to achieve legislation 
which limited fox hunting. Of course, 
those who are adamantly against fox 
hunting may not care who legislates, but 
there is a problem here and it should not 
be too easily dismissed. This is especially 
true with an entity like the EU, which is 
very much a legal construct only empow-
ered by the Member States of the Union 
to legislate in accordance with the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
The main problem with the Regula-
tion on Seal Products, from my point of 
view, was that it was never really clear 
what the European Parliament was 
legally trying to achieve, nor why we 
were doing it within a legal framework 
policy and trade ban on seal products, 
the EU has sometimes clashed with 
Arctic interest groups. This was initially 
complicating its bid for Arctic Council 
observership, though recent moves have 
been made for compromise. On fisher-
ies, the EU is close to the Arctic Council 
mainstream in believing that the exploi-
tation of new ice-free waters should be 
delayed pending a full scientific assess-
ment. 
So far so good: but why then is the 
EU still not seen as a suitable Arctic 
Council observer? Politically, the latest 
complication is that the EU economic 
sanctions adopted during the Ukraine 
crisis have angered Russia and are, in 
fact, starting to block off some funding 
options for Arctic projects. The EU’s 
problem here is that it has an overall 
stance towards Moscow in which the 
Arctic plays only a limited part, and 
its legalistic nature gives it less scope 
than a national government to vary its 
approach in different cases. At least 
temporarily, therefore, Brussels finds it 
hard to come forward as a clean-handed 
supporter of the Arctic peace it sincerely 
seeks.
There are also more mundane prob-
lems. The EU’s ‘diplomatic service’ 
(the European External Action Service) 
claims coordinating rights over Arctic 
policy, but the more important practi-
cal fields like shipping, fisheries and 
climate policy development are run by 
the European Commission. Maintaining 
coherence is a struggle. Moreover, many 
EU nations have yet to take Arctic issues 
seriously and two of the front-liners – 
Denmark and Sweden – have mixed 
feelings about possible Brussels inter-
ference. Germany, the UK and France 
have only very recently defined their 
Arctic aims. 
All this said, further delay over the 
Arctic Council Observership is more 
a symbolic than a practical block to 
stronger EU involvement. Much could 
be achieved by tighter coordination, 
more flexible funding, and a more sensi-
tive grasp of Arctic partners’ own aims 
and feelings. l
Inuit hunter feeds his child with still warm meat from just hunted ring seal, Pond 
Inlet, Canada
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meant only to regulate the circulation of 
goods in the European market. It now 
seems clear, thanks to the outcome of 
lengthy proceedings in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), that if Europe-
ans do not want seal products in their 
market based on cultural grounds or 
sensitivities, then that is their right, as 
long as the prohibition or exemptions to 
it are applied consistently.
However, the European legislative 
process was, at the time, less about 
products and much more about hunting, 
especially the hunting of seals in Canada. 
It seemed from the piles of letters that 
arrived in my office that a very active 
and competent animal rights NGO had 
instigated a huge campaign. Humane 
Society International, which has its ori-
gins in the U.S., was very successfully 
campaigning to get the European legis-
lature to regulate an activity carried out 
in a third state: Canada. It seemed all the 
more strange given that there is also a 
large seal hunt in Namibia, but this was 
almost never mentioned as the concen-
tration was on cruelty in Canada.
When I took the role as Parliament’s 
rapporteur I did so on the basis of a 
track record of activity in relation to 
the Internal Market and a huge inter-
est in Arctic affairs. Indeed, with oth-
ers, I had been instrumental in several 
resolutions of the Parliament on Arctic 
issues, as we then thought the EU was 
edging towards membership of the 
Arctic Council. Every time the Arctic 
was discussed in the Parliament there 
was huge emphasis on the rights of the 
Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. Here 
I thought was a chance to bring this 
together. 
The proposed legislation purported 
to exempt seal products hunted by such 
peoples for subsistence purposes, but 
the fact that their products would be 
associated with a ‘ban’, seemed inevita-
bly damaging to any genuine market. I 
started to formulate an alternative prop-
osition based on a labelling regime, thus 
leaving the market and the informed 
consumer to decide. Even the ‘ban’ itself 
would require comprehensive label-
ling to maintain so it was not such an 
unworkable or burdensome alternative. 
To me it had the merit of offering some 
sort of lifeline to the fragile Indigenous 
communities, especially in places like 
Greenland. More importantly, I thought 
it better respected the proportionality 
and subsidiarity requirements that all 
EU law should meet.
Prior to the 
first vote in 
committee 
there appeared 
to be a broad 
coalition pre-
pared to sup-
port this alter-
native proposi-
tion. However, 
animal rights 
activists had been busy contacting min-
isters in capitals and European political 
parties. It should also be recalled that 
this came in the run-up to European 
Parliament elections in June 2009. 
Every committee member had a hotel 
type hanger put on their door indicating 
the pros and cons of each side and later 
every parliamentarian was to receive 
a fluffy white toy seal bearing a label 
showing blood and the slogan ‘doomed 
to die’ even though these white seal 
pups had been protected by EU conser-
vation legislation since the 1980s. 
The legitimate aim of the legislation 
was opaque; it was constructed finally 
not as a ‘ban’ or ‘prohibition’ but rather 
as an indication as to what goods could 
SEALS HAVE GOOD PR, 
AGAINST WHICH, SADLY, 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
CANNOT COMPETE 
DIANA WALLIS 
is the President 
of the Euro-
pean Law Insti-
tute and British 
former Member, then Vice-
President of the European 
Parliament
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‘High time’ EU gets 
observer status: UK
Gone are the days of the 19th and early 20th century when 
Britain’s Royal Navy ruled the seven seas and saw itself as 
the world’s peacekeeper through flying the flag or – on occa-
sion – using its gunboat diplomacy. Also gone are the days 
when British explorers were among the few that first mapped 
the most remote and inhospitable regions of our planet.  
While the balances of power have changed, as LORD ROBIN 
TEVERSON points out, geography has not. 
BRITAIN IS STILL the nearest neighbour-
ing non-Arctic state. The northernmost 
tip of the British Isles, the Shetland 
Island’s ‘Out Stack’ or Oosta, is a mere 
320 nautical miles south of the Arctic 
Circle. The Arctic remains a part of the 
UK’s backyard. What happens there 
– climate change, pollution, security, 
shipping routes, or territorial claims 
– has a knock-on effect on British inter-
ests.
This is why the House of Lords took 
the decision in 2014 to set up a select 
committee to scrutinise the Govern-
ment’s policies for the High North. We 
set about our task by taking evidence in 
parliament while members visited the 
Yukon, Iceland, Tromsø and Svalbard.
The impetus for our enquiry was one 
of change. The Arctic is the region of 
greatest transformation on our planet – 
the fastest rising temperatures, melting 
ice, increasing mineral exploration, the 
start of mass tourism, and opening sea 
routes. 
From a diplomatic point of view, 
Britain may still be a major player in 
research and an observer at the Arctic 
Council. However, its historic activity is 
at risk of being eclipsed by the welcome 
interest of more distant nations, not 
least from Asia.
As the committee undertook its 
work it also became clear that the UK 
had wider interests in the High North: 
London is a global centre of business, 
finance and insurance; it is the head-
quarters of the International Maritime 
Organisation and OSPAR (the Conven-
tion for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlan-
tic); we have a long history of polar sci-
ence and expertise from the North Sea 
on gas exploration.
The British Government produced its 
own Arctic policy document in 2013. It 
was cautiously called a ‘policy frame-
work’ – avoiding the word ‘strategy’ so 
as not to be seen as too bold. But did 
this reticence risk sending out a signal 
of indifference to the rest of the world?
That same year the Arctic Council 
expanded the number of its observer 
be placed on the EU market; that was 
those complying with the so-called 
‘Inuit exception’. Working out how that 
exception applies has proved difficult in 
the subsequent legal wrangles. Clearly 
the legislation was not a conservation 
measure; the seal populations are not 
under threat, indeed fishermen will tell 
you there are too many eating too much 
fish! If it was an animal welfare concern 
then seals as wild animals were likely to 
end up with similar or greater protec-
tion than any animals reared commer-
cially in the food chain for consumption 
of their meat. If the issue was a cultural 
one, like the ban on cat and dog fur 
products, then again this seemed at 
first encounter unbalanced given that 
cats and dogs are family pets in Europe, 
seals are not. There is no doubt, as I 
finally remarked, that seals have good 
PR, against which, sadly, Indigenous 
peoples cannot compete. 
Images of Inuit women sobbing in my 
office, distraught at what might happen 
in their communities, remain with me 
from the process as does the shocked 
silence during a telephone call with a 
Canadian minister as she began to com-
prehend that a transnational legislature 
in another continent could intervene in 
the commercial activities of her country.
Aside from the damage to these Indig-
enous communities, there was damage 
to the EU’s credibility as a legitimate 
Arctic actor. There is little doubt in 
my mind that is why the EU, six years 
on, has not progressed to becoming an 
official observer of the Arctic Council 
let alone a full member. Of course, Can-
ada’s new government may now take a 
different view. 
The whole process left me wondering 
about EU law-making. Of course, if a 
measure has popular support politi-
cians must give way, but it should be 
informed and legal. Also, human and 
animal rights should be carefully bal-
anced. Let me put it this way, I ride 
horses but I would never join a hunt, 
nor would I want to see the EU legislat-
ing about such domestic UK matters; 
even more so if my country were not a 
member of the EU! l
THE EU IS A MAJOR 
 SUPRANATIONAL POWER 
THAT CAN ACT AS AN 
IMPORTANT COORDINA-
TOR OF EXTERNAL ACTION
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states with the admission of China, 
India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore 
and Italy. Instead of being one of four 
original observer states, the UK was 
now one of twelve.
Our recommendations were wide 
ranging: 
 ■ the UK should appoint an Arctic 
Ambassador to coordinate the UK’s 
North Polar activities and raise our 
northern game 
 ■ there should be a moratorium on 
fishing in Arctic international waters 
until the ocean’s ecology is far better 
understood 
 ■ the UK’s contribution to polar 
research should be increased, especially 
regarding permafrost thaw 
 ■ the fall in oil prices should be an 
opportunity to pause offshore explora-
tion to resolve the very real environ-
mental dangers.
 ■ the Arctic 
Council should 
continue to 
receive the full 
support of the 
UK in its work 
as a successful 
Photo: Keith Edkins, Wikimedia Commons
THE MOVE TO A PERMA-
NENT OFFICIAL ROLE HAS 
BEEN SOURED BY THE 
DISPUTE WITH CANADA 
OVER SEAL PRODUCTS. 
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A call for a two- 
tier EU policy
In 2014, the European Parliament called for the formula-
tion of a “united EU policy on the Arctic” and a “coherent 
strategy and concretized action plan on the EU’s engage-
ment in the Arctic.” The Council of the European Union 
also requested the European Commission to further devel-
op “an integrated and coherent Arctic Policy”.  
However, as ADAM STEPIEN observes, it appears nobody 
knows how to accomplish such a coherent approach. 
SINCE THE END of 2014, the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) and the 
European Commission have been work-
ing on a new policy document. The new 
communication is likely to build on pri-
orities proposed in earlier statements, 
but a more explicit distinction between 
the two geographic policy spaces – 
European Arctic and pan-Arctic issues 
– may also be expected. But that may, 
however, not go far enough to promote 
greater coherence in EU Arctic activities 
and address diverse challenges related 
to the EU-Arctic nexus. Therefore, the 
EU policymakers should consider a two-
tier structure for future Arctic policy. 
These two tiers would be: a general 
policy for the Circumpolar Arctic and 
a focused strategy for the European 
Arctic. The latter would address chosen 
challenges associated with Arctic envi-
ronmental and socio-economic changes, 
as they are manifested in Europe’s 
northernmost regions. 
The EU has been formulating its 
Arctic policy since 2008. Its interest 
was originally related to the predicted 
climate-driven, profound environmental 
changes such as melting sea-ice, as well 
as overblown expectations for a boom 
in resource extraction and shipping. As 
a result, the EU focused on the Arctic 
Ocean environment, resources and 
international cooperation. This focus is 
still dominant.
However, over time the policy encom-
passed topics relevant for the European 
Arctic including regional development, 
terrestrial transport, mining and the 
Indigenous Sámi issues. Actors from 
Europe’s northernmost regions had 
pointed out that the EU policy ignored 
part of the Arctic, which is inhabited by 
EU citizens and directly affected by EU 
legislation, policies and programmes.
The EU Arctic policy has so far mixed 
up the two distinct spaces: Circumpolar 
and European Arctic. That partly con-
tributed to analysts’ and Arctic stake-
holders’ disappointment with consecu-
tive EU policy documents, which lacked 
concreteness and focus.
regional organisation of governance 
 ■ the USA should ratify the UNCLOS 
treaty (the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Seas) that will deter-
mine the many territorial claims around 
the Pole 
 ■ the UK should work to help isolate 
other wider geopolitical problems. The 
Crimean annexation took place during 
the work of the committee but Arctic 
cooperation needs to continue despite 
wider tensions. 
There were many other recommenda-
tions, not least supporting the robust 
involvement of the Indigenous peoples 
of the Arctic. But we also strongly rec-
ommended that the European Union 
should at last be given full observer sta-
tus at the Arctic Council.
It could be argued that with Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland as full members of 
the Council, and seven other EU states 
as observers, it is hardly necessary. But 
the EU is a major supranational power 
that can act as an important coordina-
tor of external action: it has one of the 
world’s largest research budgets and it 
is a key player in fisheries management 
in northern waters adjoining the Arctic.
The EU has been an ‘ad hoc’ observer 
since 1998. The move to a permanent 
official role has been soured by the dis-
pute with Canada over seal products. 
Now that this has been resolved, it is the 
EU’s robust reaction to Russia’s inter-
vention in Ukraine that is proving to be 
the barrier.
There is no doubt that the EU as a 
fully-fledged observer would be benefi-
cial to the Arctic’s future and strengthen 
the Arctic Council itself.
The Arctic Council is young in terms 
of international organisations and has 
a good track record of success. It is in 
the interest of all countries, including 
the UK, that the Council increases its 
authority and is successful as the Arctic 
undergoes continued rapid change. l
“THE EU ARCTIC POLICY 
APPEARS MESSY, UNFO-
CUSED AND INCIDENTAL”
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EU policy-making for the Circumpo-
lar Arctic and European Arctic entails 
dealing with two different sets of issues 
and engaging different stakeholders. 
Circumpolar Arctic questions are pri-
marily of maritime nature where the EU 
is a secondary actor, while European 
Arctic challenges are chiefly terrestrial 
and the EU is there a key player. When 
the calls for a “coherent strategy” are 
voiced, usually they refer to the Euro-
pean Arctic space. 
A solution would be to bring under 
one framework two distinct approaches 
and organizing EU Arctic engagement 
into a two-tier “policy + strategy”. 
A Circumpolar Arctic policy-tier 
would retain the current set of gen-
eral, vague objectives. It would include 
maritime issues, climate change mitiga-
tion, climate and ocean research, earth 
observation, involvement in the Arctic 
Council, and the EU’s role in shaping 
Arctic-relevant international norms, 
such as for Arctic shipping or long-
range pollution.
A focused strategy for the European 
Arctic constitutes the second tier. It 
would address challenges arising from 
Arctic change as they are manifested in 
Europe’s northernmost regions. A short 
list of specific goals or targets would be 
identified together with Nordic states, 
northernmost regions and local stake-
holders. Concrete action plans have to 
be agreed on. All relevant actors need to 
commit to the targets and to the imple-
mentation of actions. 
Several possible goals for the strate-
gy-tier could be envisaged. Actors have 
to jointly address climate adaptation 
in Europe’s fastest warming region. 
Among targets could be the North-
South and intra-regional transport 
networks, digital connectivity, as well as 
tackling developmental or demographic 
problems specific to this sparsely 
populated area. The challenges faced 
by the Sámi also have to be highlighted, 
including energizing traditional liveli-
hoods in light of expanding resource 
extraction. 
The strategy-tier is likely to empha-
size economic development, as that is 
the approach promoted by many region-
al stakeholders. Embedding the Euro-
pean Arctic strategy into the general 
Arctic policy could help to safeguard the 
balance with environmental priorities. 
Otherwise, the environment might get 
lost between the lines. 
There are a number of issues that are 
relevant from the point of view of both 
pan-Arctic cooperation and the Euro-
pean Arctic development. These include 
cooperation within the Barents region 
(Barents Euro-Arctic Council, where the 
Commission is a full member), cross-
border transport networks extending 
to Russia and Norway, and pan-Arctic 
business and NGO cooperation. A two-
tier policy would deal with these issues 
better than two disconnected policies 
- for the Arctic and for Northern Fen-
noscandia.
Iceland and Norway are the European 
Economic Area members and Norwe-
gian regions are particularly closely 
linked to the EU territories. If willing, 
these states should fully participate in 
the drafting and implementation of the 
strategy-tier.
The strategy-tier has to have added 
value in relation to existing structures 
such as the Northern Dimension, 
regional cooperation, and cross-border 
programmes, for example Northern 
Periphery and Arctic Programme. No 
new funding mechanisms or bureau-
cracy should be proposed, as they are 
unlikely to be established. Instead, 
the strategy could streamline existing 
financing, prevent duplications and in 
the long-term affect priorities of fund-
ing instruments. The formulation and 
implementation of the strategy could 
also influence general EU sectoral poli-
cies, insofar as they have distinct impli-
cations for the European Arctic.
The two-tier policy requires organiza-
tional adjustments. Currently, the Euro-
pean External Action Service and the 
DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries coor-
dinate Arctic policy-making. That would 
continue to be the case for the first tier 
of the EU Arctic policy, where the focus 
is on maritime and external affairs. The 
strategy-tier 
should be led 
by the Com-
mission’s units 
responsible 
for regional 
development, 
transport or 
environment. 
In addition, 
establishing 
a network of 
national con-
tact points or 
a stakeholder 
forum could be 
considered.
A two-tier structure would allow the 
“EU Arctic Policy” to better accom-
modate diverse interests and to make 
a tangible difference in various EU 
Arctic-related activities, without causing 
anxiety among Arctic states and other 
actors. Nevertheless, this is arguably an 
ambitious approach. It calls for a more 
comprehensive way of thinking about 
the EU-Arctic nexus and for a different 
coordination of Arctic portfolios within 
EU services. l 
The opinions expressed here are  
based on the author’s analysis pub-
lished by The Arctic Institute.
EU POLICY-MAKING FOR 
THE CIRCUMPOLAR ARCTIC 
AND EUROPEAN ARCTIC 
ENTAILS TWO DIFFER-
ENT SETS OF ISSUES 
AND ENGAGING DIFFER-
ENT STAKEHOLDERS.
ADAM STEPIEN 
is a researcher 
in the Arctic 
Centre at Uni-
versity of Lap-
land, Finland. 
He works on Arctic govern-
ance, Indigenous politics 
and the EU-Arctic nexus. 
He was a co-editor of the 
2014 “Strategic Assess-
ment of Development of 
the Arctic”.
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Piloting  
Arctic Passages
Melting sea ice is reviving the centuries-old dream of an 
Arctic “silk route” connecting European or North Ameri-
can ports to Asia.  With navigating the Arctic becoming a 
reality, MARIA DELIGIANNI says European shipowners need 
more investments in infrastructure and technology.
PRECAUTIONS NEED to be taken to 
ensure safety of life at sea and the sus-
tainability of these highly sensitive envi-
ronments is not compromised. While 
the International Maritime Organi-
sation (IMO) remains the primary 
regulator for the shipping industry, the 
European Com-
munity Ship-
owners’ Asso-
ciations (ECSA) 
endorses the 
actions taken by 
the European 
Union towards 
the development 
of a policy on 
Arctic issues, 
especially in increasing knowledge of 
the region and investing in research and 
development.
The Polar Code was intensely debated 
by the IMO for more than four years 
before adoption in 2014 by its Maritime 
Safety Committee (MSC). From the 
beginning European shipowners under-
scored that a mandatory and uniform 
regulatory framework is a prerequisite 
to ensure maritime safety and environ-
mental protection, as polar shipping 
grows in volume and diversifies in the 
coming years. This is the single, most 
expeditious solution to achieve coordi-
nation and harmonisation of national 
legislation. 
As European Shipowners, we support 
that the risk-based approach followed 
by the Polar Code will indeed boost the 
level of confidence in the safety and 
environmental performance of shipping. 
As of 2017, we are set to comply with 
IMO requirements by carrying onboard 
the Polar Ship Certificate stating the 
adequacy of the vessel to navigate in the 
region and the Polar Water Operational 
Manual – an essential tool in evaluat-
ing the anticipated range of operating 
conditions and hazards to ensure the 
decision-making process onboard is 
adjusted accordingly.
The Code has been criticized for a 
number of omissions on issues such as 
heavy fuel oil use by vessels, the lack of 
invasive species’ protections and suf-
ficient oil spill response requirements. 
We consider the Polar Code to be the 
first decisive step by the IMO at this 
stage. The importance of the Code is its 
mandatory nature that ensures a level 
playing field. However, we acknowl-
edge that more needs to be done and 
anticipate amendments will follow to 
strengthen the current provisions. 
It is unrealistic to believe that the Arc-
tic will be immediately accessible as sea 
ice disappears. Firstly, an ice-free Arctic 
Ocean year-round is false, as sea ice 
will always re-form during winter and 
ice properties and coverage will vary 
greatly within the region. There are also 
many other challenges that shipowners 
encounter such as polar darkness, poor 
charts, lack of critical infrastructure and 
navigation control systems, low search-
and-rescue capability, and other non-
climatic factors. 
Therefore, development of the 
appropriate regulatory framework 
should be accompanied by reinforced 
infrastructure and technology. Other 
critical investments include: improved 
navigation aids; accuracy of nautical 
charts; weather forecasts; monitoring 
of drifting ice and icing conditions as 
well as search and rescue infrastructure 
for defined incident scenarios. These 
MARIA DELI-
GIANNI is a 
Policy Advisor 
on Maritime 
Safety, Envi-
ronment and Offshore 
at European Community 
Shipowners’ Associations 
(ECSA)
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are just some of the critical factors that 
need to be addressed in a region in 
which extreme weather events are rou-
tine occurrences. 
Maintaining a positive reputation for 
operators, as the area is increasingly 
exploited, is also a challenge. Maritime 
transport and energy extraction depend 
on both local and global acceptance 
of increased industrial activity in the 
Arctic. Investment in relationships is 
imperative for local and global accept-
ance of increasing industrial activities in 
the Arctic. This confidence can be built 
through investments in ice research, 
forecasting and communications to 
ensure operational risks can be prop-
erly assessed and mitigated. A broad 
focus on knowledge and research is also 
crucial for increasing activities in the 
Arctic.
As demonstrated by the successful 
development of the Polar Code, IMO is 
the appropriate forum for developing 
standards for ships operating in the Arc-
tic. It has the necessary legal and techni-
cal expertise to take full account of the 
interests of all maritime nations, includ-
ing those with an Arctic coastline. 
Discussions on an EU Policy on arctic 
issues are also gaining momentum. In 
principle, we endorse the three pil-
lars identified by the 2012 Joint Com-
munication Commission and High 
Representative of the EU for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy: support 
research and channel knowledge; act 
with responsibility; and intensify the 
constructive engagement and dialogue 
with Arctic States. We also acknowledge 
EU’s actions in becoming one of the key 
investors in the region by exploring fur-
ther investment and research priorities.
The EU could play a prominent 
role in addressing some of these chal-
lenges through the development of 
satellite communication and tracking 
and monitoring systems to ensure safe 
navigation and enable search and rescue 
(SAR) operations. This could take place 
through Galileo and Copernicus, the 
global navigation satellite system which 
provides a highly accurate, global posi-
tioning service.   
In addition, a highly-developed infra-
structure of geographical information 
through the creation of a digital atlas of 
the Arctic should be established. Com-
piling geographical information and 
obtaining a complete picture of what is 
happening at a given location (maps, 
charts, records, etc.) is also crucial. This 
data should be collected, maintained 
and made available in the most effec-
tive manner, perhaps through the Arctic 
Information Center the European Com-
mission is considering. 
The EU could also develop a platform 
to pool data on the state of the seas in 
and around Europe and high-resolution 
sea-bed mapping. This would further 
assist in establishing safe transport 
routes in Arctic waters.
Last but not least, it is clear that 
future initiatives in the Arctic will neces-
sitate an increase in maritime training 
capacity. Specialised courses focusing 
on High North/Arctic operations should 
be enhanced to offer relevant and quali-
fied manpower in the offshore and mari-
time domain. Improved competence 
requirements and standards will ensure 
there is knowledge and understanding 
of Arctic conditions. The EU could play 
a prominent role in developing these 
programmes. 
Shipping activities in the Arctic 
must take place within the framework 
of uniform regulatory framework and 
adequate infrastructure that ensures 
quality shipping among all operators 
in the region. Any maritime accident in 
the vulnerable Arctic is an accident that 
affects us all. l
WE CONSIDER THE POLAR 
CODE TO BE THE FIRST 
DECISIVE STEP BY THE 
IMO AT THIS STAGE. 
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Cargo ship and icebergs, Illulissat, Greenland
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Finland: wearing two hats
Finland is a member of both the EU and the Arctic Council. It is an active participant in the 
European integration project – the process of industrial, political, legal, economic, social 
and cultural integration of states through the European Union. TIMO KOIVUROVA says although 
Finland is a “small actor” in the EU, he writes that this country has – with some success – 
played its “northern card” to pursue its own interests and policy goals while encouraging 
the EU to pay more attention to Arctic issues.
FINLAND JOINED the EU in 1995 after a 
referendum which saw nearly 57% of 
Finns supporting membership for main-
ly commercial and political reasons. 
Most of Finland’s trading partners were 
located in EU member states. Finland 
was recovering from the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the Nordic banking 
crisis in the early 1990s, and EU mem-
bership can be seen as a natural evolu-
tion of Finland’s foreign policy. Since 
the 1950s, foreign policy decisions have 
been cautiously – due to the delicate 
relationship with the Soviet Union – 
but consistently establishing ties with 
Western intergovernmental institutions, 
culminating with EU membership. It 
was also significant that Finland, Nor-
way and Sweden decided to pursue EU 
membership at the same time. Finland 
had strong international co-operation 
with the Nordic states prior to EU mem-
bership with especially good economic 
and social ties with Sweden.
Finland has been generally supportive 
towards deepening the role of the EU as 
an economic and political union. Com-
pared with other Nordic states, Finland 
has clearly been the most EU-minded. 
It is the only Nordic country that joined 
the monetary union, adopting the Euro 
as its currency while Sweden and Den-
mark remained outside of the Eurozone. 
Norway and Iceland have ties with the 
EU through the European Economic 
Area Agreement, but Norway has twice 
rejected EU membership while Iceland 
has ended its membership negotia-
tions, which commenced after the island 
nation was struck by the banking crisis. 
Eurasian brown bear, 
Kuhmo, Finland
PROFESSOR TIMO KOIVUROVA is a 
director of the Arctic Centre of the 
U of Lapland, Finland. His expertise 
includes Arctic legal & governance 
questions, environmental law & 
Indigenous rights.
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In the last two decades, major politi-
cal parties in Finland have favoured EU 
membership, with the exception of the 
populist Finns party, which is currently 
in government. The Finnish people have 
also been fairly supportive of EU mem-
bership although those critical are often 
unhappy with the extensive range of EU 
legislation regulating many aspects of 
Finnish economic and social life.
What, then, is the influence of a small 
Nordic country on this pan-European 
regulatory framework, now crucial for 
Finland? A member state’s influence in 
the EU is, to a great extent, based on 
how the country actually pursues its 
policy goals and interests in the Union. 
Finland is considered to be fairly active. 
Finns emphasize efficiency and open-
ness of decision-making and they have a 
reputation of implementing EU legisla-
tion in an effective manner.
Finland also has a strong track record 
as an active participant in Arctic co-
operation. Finland proposed and led 
the initiative to launch the 1991 Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS) between the eight Arctic states. 
This strategy was later adopted by the 
current Arctic Council. However, while 
Finland has significantly contributed to 
the work of the Council, it is not a major 
player in Arctic politics compared with 
Arctic Ocean coastal states and especial-
ly major Arctic powers such as Russia, 
Canada and the United States.
Finland attempted to merge these 
South-Western and Northern policy 
directions through the successful pro-
posal of the Northern Dimension policy 
for the EU. Since 2006, the Northern 
Dimension has been resuscitated as a 
joint policy between the EU, Iceland, 
Norway and Russia. 
Finland has also been very supportive 
of making the EU an Observer at the 
Arctic Council. The EU’s increased pres-
ence and funding could support Finn-
ish policies and socio-economic needs, 
including research, maritime govern-
ance, the development of Europe’s 
northernmost regions and Finnish 
stances on Arctic climate change and 
environmental conservation.
There are no real tensions or contra-
dictions arising from Finland being a 
member of both the EU and the Arctic 
Council. The Arctic Council’s influences 
largely comprise scientific assessments 
and guidelines and the co-operation 
does not entail any legally binding obli-
gations. However the Arctic Council has 
recently catalysed two legally binding 
agreements between the eight Arctic 
states on search and rescue and oil spill 
response. More are likely for the future. 
Therefore, the EU institutions need to 
make sure that any legal obligations 
are in accordance with what Finland 
and other EU members have commit-
ted themselves to in EU law. So far, no 
problems are apparent given that both 
new legally binding agreements are 
based on existing global treaties that are 
already part of EU law. 
However, if the Arctic Council were to 
transform from an intergovernmental 
forum into a treaty-based intergovern-
mental organization with legal decision-
making power – a scenario Finland 
proposed in its 2013 Arctic strategy 
for the Arctic states to seriously con-
sider – there would need to be clearer 
understanding of possible member 
states’ duties to co-ordinate their Arctic 
policies within the Arctic Council and to 
pay attention to the duties set out by the 
EU’s legal system. l 
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Greenland – walking the middle path
THREE OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL countries 
are members of the EU, but one of them 
has a particularly complex relation-
ship with the trading bloc. Denmark is 
a member of the Arctic Council  largely 
because Greenland is part of the king-
dom of Denmark. However, Greenland 
is not part of the EU. The mostly inde-
pendent Arctic island formally withdrew 
from the European Economic Commu-
nity (the forerunner of the EU) in 1985, 
but is still associated with the Union. 
This association gives each side some 
particular benefits. For Greenland, the 
most obvious is money.
Through the EU-Greenland Partner-
ship (2014-2020), €217.8 million will 
come from the EU to the Greenland 
government. Much of the money is 
earmarked for education and training. 
In allocating the money, the European 
Council notes, “Union financial assis-
tance, allocated through the partner-
ship, should bring a European perspec-
tive to the development of Greenland 
and should contribute to the strength-
ening of the close and long lasting ties 
with it, while strengthening the position 
of Greenland as an advanced outpost of 
the Union, based on the common values 
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Fishermen in a fishing boat, Disko Bay, Greenland.
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The European Parliament 
& EU Arctic policy
The European Union may have a relatively small territory 
above the Arctic Circle but FERNANDO GARCES DE LOS FAYOS 
says it has always been an important and engaged Arctic 
actor. In terms of Arctic research he notes the EU, along 
with the EU Member States, is one of the leading forces in 
the world. He argues that the Union works hard to encour-
age international research collaboration with its sectoral 
policies, and its cross-border actions have a significant 
impact on the Arctic region. 
THE EU ARCTIC POLICY has been built 
gradually since 2008 in a process that 
is still ongoing. From the outset, the EU 
Arctic policy was meant to be a common 
enterprise of the EU institutions and the 
EU Member States, open to inputs from 
other Arctic States and other Arctic 
stakeholders. Its first building block, the 
2008 European Commission Communi-
cation on the EU and the Arctic, was the 
result of a vast consultation exercise. A 
second Communication in 2012 consoli-
dated the EU Arctic policy, maintaining 
three basic priorities:
 ■ support research and channel knowl-
edge to address environmental chal-
lenges, most notably climate change in 
the Arctic;
 ■ Act with responsibility to assist in 
ensuring economic development in the 
Arctic is based on sustainable use of 
resources and environmental expertise;
 ■ intensify its constructive engagement 
and dialogue with Arctic States, Indig-
enous peoples and other partners.
The European Parliament (EP) has 
agreed with this basic line and has pro-
vided valuable input into the construc-
and history which links the partners.”
The money is a bump up from a pre-
vious agreement between the EU and 
Greenland that sent 25 million euros a 
year to Greenland’s government. Some 
observers have suggested that the agree-
ments in effect help buy the EU access 
to Greenlandic resources at a time 
when the Arctic is increasingly seen as a 
resource and a strategic crossroads. The 
latest agreement was signed following 
some public musings from Greenland’s 
former premier about the EU commit-
ment to Greenland, on the heels of an 
unprecedented 3-day visit to Denmark 
by former Chinese leader Hu Jintao.
A joint declaration on relations 
between the European Union and the 
Government of Greenland and the Gov-
ernment of Denmark, signed March 
19th, 2015 stated their intention to 
continue and further strengthen their 
relations and cooperation in the follow-
ing areas:
 ■ Sustainably managing fish stocks 
and the marine environment as well 
as providing fishing opportunities for 
the vessels of EU Member States which 
should remain an essential pillar of the 
partnership between the EU and Green-
land and continue to be based on the EU 
Greenland Fisheries Partnership Agree-
ment and its Protocols.
 ■ Education and training, tourism and 
culture.
 ■ Natural resources, including raw 
materials.
 ■ Energy, climate, environment and 
biodiversity.
 ■ Arctic issues.
 ■ The social sector; mobility of work-
force; social protection systems; food 
safety and food security issues.
 ■ Research and innovation in areas 
such as energy, climate change, disaster 
resilience, natural resources, including 
raw materials, and sustainable use of 
living resources. l
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/
files/signed-joint-declaration-eu-greenland-
denmark_en.pdf
IN TERMS OF ARCTIC 
RESEARCH, THE EU IS 
ONE OF THE LEADING 
FORCES IN THE WORLD
FERNANDO GARCES DE LOS FAYOS 
is a Senior parliamentary policy ana-
lyst with the European Parliament
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THE SÁMI PEOPLE INHABIT almost half 
of Norway and Sweden, the northern 
part of Finland, as well as North-West 
Russia. A large percentage of the Sámi 
are EU citizens, and those residing in 
Norway are affected by EU decisions 
through the European Economic Area 
(EEA) agreement. The Sámi are the only 
Indigenous people within the European 
Union and up until recently, the EU 
commitment to the Sámi has been lim-
ited to regional cooperation and project 
funding. 
Throughout the last decade, the Euro-
pean Union has put heavy efforts into 
joining the Arctic Council as an observ-
er. That has proved challenging, as the 
tion of the EU’s Arctic policy. On top 
of regular questioning of the European 
Commission and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) whilst reflecting 
Arctic concerns in the work of its differ-
ent Committees, three key resolutions 
have channelled the main views of the 
EP on Arctic policy, i.e. 9 October 2008, 
29 September 2011 and 12 March 2014. 
The latter EP resolution (2014), along 
with the Council of the EU Conclusions 
of 12 May 2014, asks for a new Commu-
nication, taking into account the recent 
developments in the Arctic and in EU 
action in the Arctic.
The EP went a step further asking for 
the new document to be a proper EU 
strategy for the Arctic region, in line 
with the national Arctic strategies of EU 
Arctic and non-Arctic Member States. 
The new Communication was expected 
by the end of last year but it has still 
not been issued at the time of writing 
(mid-January 2016), probably because 
the text needs to reflect the achieve-
ments and new avenues opened up by 
the 21st Conference of the Parties of 
the UN Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCC) held in Paris in 
December, 2015. 
The EP is eager to see how the new 
Communication reflects the recom-
mendations that it called for in its 2014 
Resolution. Several of these recom-
mendations refer to Arctic Indigenous 
Peoples and other citizens living in the 
Arctic.  The European Parliament:
 ■ emphasises that the EU must take 
into account the need for raw material 
activities to provide local benefits and 
garner good will with the Arctic popula-
tions;
 ■ urges the Commission to proceed 
with the establishment of an ‘EU Arctic 
Information Centre’;
 ■ recommends strengthening regular 
exchange and consultations on Arctic-
related topics with regional, local and 
Indigenous stakeholders of the Euro-
pean Arctic in order to facilitate mutual 
understanding;
 ■ stresses that maintaining developed 
and sustainable communities in the 
Arctic with a high quality of life is of the 
utmost importance, and that the EU can 
play a vital role in the matter;
 ■ Acknowledges the wish of the 
inhabitants and governments of the 
Arctic region, with sovereign rights and 
responsibilities, to continue to pursue 
sustainable economic development 
while at the same time, protecting the 
traditional sources of the Indigenous 
peoples’ livelihoods and the very sensi-
tive nature of Arctic ecosystems. The 
EP also “regrets the effects which the 
EU regulation relating to the ban on 
seal products has produced for sections 
of the population, and in particular for 
Indigenous culture and livelihood”.
 ■ supports the meetings held by the 
Commission with the six associations of 
circumpolar Indigenous peoples that are 
recognised as permanent participants in 
the Arctic Council;
 ■ Underlines the importance of sup-
porting the development of cooperation 
networks between higher education 
institutions within and beyond the 
region, providing opportunities for 
research funding in order to bring about 
sustainable economic development in 
the regions of the Arctic.
Several other recommendations 
regarding the Arctic environment can be 
summarised with the following one:
 ■ The European Parliament stresses 
that the increasing use of the Arctic 
region’s natural resources must be con-
ducted in a way which respects and ben-
efits the local population, both Indig-
enous and non-Indigenous, and takes 
full environmental responsibility for the 
fragile Arctic environment.
Another way in which the EP interacts 
with the Arctic is as a member of the 
Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians, 
which brings together parliamentar-
ians from around the Arctic, and is an 
observer at the Arctic Council. l 
The opinions expressed are those of the 
author.
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EU discovered that among other things, 
its ignorance regarding Indigenous peo-
ples in the Arctic was a barrier. Banning 
the import of seal products in 2009 was 
a tough hurdle for the Union, and the 
Gwich’in representative was succinct 
when asked at the First Arctic Dialogue 
Workshop in Brussels in 2010 what the 
EU could do for the Indigenous peoples 
in the Arctic. Quite simply, he said: 
“First, drop the seal ban.” 
The EU seal ban demonstrated the 
lack of knowledge among European 
decision makers regarding the Arctic 
and its inhabitants by the absence of 
Indigenous peoples’ voices in Brussels. 
The seal ban was amended in 2015, as 
a result of the EU acknowledging that a 
sincere dialogue with Indigenous peo-
ples is necessary to play the Arctic game. 
The WTO called the Inuit seal hunt “too 
Global binoculars are fixed on the Arctic. What was previously ignored as a cold wilderness 
is hotter than ever. The Arctic Council overflows with inquiries from parties wanting to take 
part in all the exciting things that might happen “up there.” CHRISTINA HENRIKSEN says the Euro-
pean Union – longing for Observer status in the Arctic Council – has suddenly realized the 
Arctic is inhabited, by Indigenous peoples, among others. How can the Indigenous peoples 
benefit from the EU participation?
The EU 
and Arctic 
Indigenous 
peoples
The Sami have been reindeer 
herders since the 17th century.
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commercial”, but how are Indigenous 
peoples supposed to survive if we can-
not make a living of our own trades and 
cultures? If an environmentalist decided 
to cry out for Rudolph, would the 
EU ban import of reindeer products? 
Hopefully not, because the EU should 
encourage the import of these products. 
Reindeer meat and wild fish are healthy 
and ecological, 
and by increas-
ing their import, 
the EU would 
contribute great-
ly to the devel-
opment of the 
Sámi society. 
While the 
first Arctic Pol-
icy more or less 
implied preservation of icebergs and 
polar bears, the human aspect is now a 
larger part of the policy. That is indeed a 
step in the right direction. The Policy is 
being renewed, though the main objec-
tives remain. It is still about interna-
tional cooperation and preserving and 
protecting the Arctic (with the peoples 
who live there), but what it all comes 
down to is promoting sustainable use of 
resources. This is the tricky part since 
the Arctic is viewed as a great source of 
raw materials and renewable resources. 
Climate changes daily affect Indig-
enous peoples globally. Our ways of 
living are affected. World leaders worry 
about climate changes, but these chang-
es also represent certain opportunities. 
If the tundra melts, then access to min-
erals is easier. If the sea ice melts in the 
North-East Passage, then cargo ships 
from Europe to Asia might get faster 
(and perhaps cheaper). 
Europe and the world need miner-
als. Recycling is not enough and new 
extraction projects are needed. Yet, the 
inhabitants of the Arctic are rarely men-
tioned. If we are, we might be referred 
to as obstacles. We might say no. We say 
no when our land and livelihood are in 
danger of being ruined for easy profits. 
That is our right, and national states 
worldwide have acknowledged that 
right, through supporting the UN Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples and the Outcome Document of the 
UN World Conference on Indigenous 
Peoples. So did the EU, and according 
to the European External Action Ser-
vice, the EU will do its share to make 
sure that the decisions and recommen-
dations of the UN World Conference on 
Indigenous Peoples document will be 
implemented, because Indigenous peo-
ples’ rights is a clear priority for the EU.
The EU demanding that the principle 
of free, prior and informed consent is 
followed when economic activities are 
planned in areas inhabited and used 
by Indigenous peoples would be a way 
to implement this. Making sure that 
international legislation and the rights 
of Indigenous peoples are mentioned 
in every discussion on extraction of raw 
materials would also be welcomed. The 
EU could also raise its voice to ensure 
environmental standards are followed 
in industrial projects while pushing its 
member states to ratify the Interna-
tional Labour Organization Convention 
No 169. This convention recognizes 
Indigenous peoples’ right to self-deter-
mination within a nation-state, while 
setting standards for national govern-
ments regarding Indigenous peoples’ 
economic, socio-cultural and political 
rights, including the right to a land base. 
So how can the EU contribute? Buy 
our products, respect our rights and 
ensure our future. l 
A driving 
force: The 
EU & polar 
research
Over the past decade 
the European Union has 
become one of the largest 
funders of Arctic research 
through numerous collab-
orative projects, coordina-
tion activities and support 
to infrastructures. NICOLE 
BIEBOW says this has estab-
lished a rewarding interplay 
between the scientific com-
munity and European policy 
makers.
AS THE ARCTIC CHANGES the European 
Union and its executive body, the Euro-
pean Commission (EC), are placing 
increasing importance on science and 
innovation in the high latitudes – for a 
variety of reasons. 
Changing weather patterns and 
climate, for example, are altering the 
sensitive ecosystem in the Arctic. Cli-
mate change triggers feedback processes 
which will have an impact on the global 
climate system. Europe will consequent-
ly be directly influenced by those chang-
es – colder winters being only one of the 
anticipated effects. Understanding these 
feedback loops and their implications 
for European society, improving predic-
tive climate models and reducing exist-
THE EU SEAL BAN DEM-
ONSTRATED THE LACK 
OF KNOWLEDGE AMONG 
EUROPEAN DECISION 
MAKERS REGARDING 
THE ARCTIC AND ITS 
INHABITANTS BY THE 
ABSENCE OF INDIG-
ENOUS PEOPLES’ VOICES
CHRISTINA 
HENRIKSEN is 
a Member of 
the Sámi Parlia-
ment in Norway, 
representing the Norwegian 
Sámi Association (NSR) 
and the Sámi Peoples’ 
Party 
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ing uncertainties have hence become 
vital. 
But changes in the Arctic also present 
economic opportunities for local com-
munities, Arctic nations and Europe at 
large. Thus the European Union has an 
interest in a continuous, but sustainable 
development of the Arctic. Science-
informed decision making is key to 
safeguarding the fragile ecosystems of 
the North, to limit risks and to enable 
adaptation of local communities.
These ecologic, societal and economic 
challenges and opportunities arising 
from Arctic change have resulted in five 
key considerations of the EC regarding 
Arctic research:
Firstly, the EC promotes open sci-
ence, meaning open access to research 
infrastructure, to data and to scientific 
results. A meaningful contribution to a 
growing and shared body of knowledge 
is dependent upon scientists having 
access to all available sources of data in 
order to facilitate an integrated review 
system for Arctic science.
The EC also strives to increase the 
predictive capabilities of climatic chang-
es, feedback processes and weather 
events through improving the quality, 
the frequency and the geographic cov-
erage of sustained observations. This 
implies an integration of space, remote, 
ground-based and underwater tools. 
Technical innovation is highlighted here 
as a mean of reducing high costs, which 
previously have been seen as a limiting 
factor in sustainable development. 
The EC seeks to establish an open 
international cooperation. Funding pro-
grammes of the EC are already open to 
applicants worldwide – a standard that 
the EC hopes to see being replicated. 
The EC says it is important to involve 
Indigenous people, local communities, 
and the relevant stakeholders in a sus-
tainable development agenda. “We wish 
to make the Arctic a test bed for sustain-
able innovation, developing protocols 
and standards, which can guarantee 
protection and sustainable exploita-
tion”, says Andrea Tilche, Head of the 
Climate Action and Earth Observation 
Unit, Directorate General for Research 
and Innovation of the European Com-
mission. 
And finally, the EC states that none 
of these objectives can be reached with-
out engaging local communities and 
relevant stakeholders. For this reason 
one of the first steps in its Horizon 2020 
framework programme for research 
and innovation was to establish a new 
coordination action, EU-PolarNet. This 
consortium – the world’s largest in 
expertise and infrastructure for polar 
research – has been called upon to 
assist the EC in giving advice in polar 
related questions, coordinating polar 
research and infrastructures in Europe 
and in identifying the highest priority 
research topics.
The EC has now proposed an invest-
ment of about 40 Million Euros in Arctic 
research and innovation for 2016/2017, 
which focuses on the following key 
strategic areas: The development of an 
integrated obser-
vation system 
for the Arctic; 
the assessment 
of the impact of 
Arctic changes 
on the weather 
and climate of 
the Northern lat-
itudes; and the 
impact of climate change on the Arctic, 
in particular on permafrost and its pos-
sible feedback and the socio-economic 
consequences. To tackle these ques-
tions, the EC seeks multidisciplinary 
and international projects with strong 
stakeholder involvement. 
Such an investment is of high impor-
tance to European polar research 
owing to the remarkable range of skills, 
knowledge and infrastructure that can 
be mobilised and coordinated in large 
EU projects. This will allow bigger and 
more complex science problems to be 
addressed, which are beyond the capac-
ity of one single nation. l 
A curious polar bear investigates an instrument tower on sea-ice. 
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SCIENCE-INFORMED DE-
CISION MAKING IS KEY 
TO SAFEGUARDING THE 
FRAGILE ECOSYSTEMS 
OF THE NORTH, TO LIMIT 
RISKS AND TO ENABLE 
ADAPTATION OF LO-
CAL COMMUNITIES
NICOLE 
BIEBOW is a 
marine geolo-
gist and execu-
tive manager of 
the EU Coordination and 
Support Action EU-Po-
larNet
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Return WWF Global Arctic Programme
275 Slater Street, Suite 810, 
Ottawa ON, K1P 5H9, CANADA
THE PICTURE
Why we are here
www.panda.org/arctic
To stop the degradation of the planet’s natural environment and
to build a future in which humans live in harmony with nature.
Survival skills
The Greenlandic Inuit Agioq and "Boatsman" making a hole in the sea ice during seal hunting at Danske Øen, 
Canada. These two Inuit participated in the 5th Thule-expedition supplying the expedition with game and skin for 
clothing. Inuit were important members of the Arctic expeditions due to their hunting and survival skills as well as 
their ability to find the safe routes in the landscape. Photograph from the 5th Thule-expedition 1921-24.
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